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Amy Namur, East‐West 
Center in Washington 
Young Professionals 
Program parƟcipant, 
explains that “OŌen, 
China’s investments in 
coal‐based 
infrastructure go 
against a country's 
naƟonal interest.“ 
Once known as the world's top carbon polluter, China has recently recommiƩed itself as a leader in 
sustainability and renewable energy. Moving to ﬁll the gaps leŌ by the United States at the Paris 
Climate Talks, China has ramped up its renewable energy commitments, including plans to cap its CO2 
emissions, drasƟcally increase forest stocks, and expand its non‐fossil fuel market share to 20 percent, 
all by 2030. This move has been highly favorable for Chinese diplomaƟc relaƟons with its Southeast 
and Paciﬁc Island neighbors who have labeled climate change as a top priority. DomesƟcally the 
extensive health impacts of air polluƟon in China has rallied public opinion against the polluƟon 
industry, making the move to green energy both a wide berth of support. While sƟll the highest CO2 
emiƫng country in the world, China has made signiﬁcant investments in renewable energy 
development and currently leads the planet in renewable investments abroad. China’s domesƟc 
commitment to sustainability has been ambiƟous; however, meeƟng these goals has created one of 
the biggest energy paradoxes of the 21st century. 
China’s economic growth conƟnues to be heavily dependent on coal. As reported by the Center for 
Strategic and InternaƟonal Studies (CSIS), coal made up about 70 percent of the PRCs energy 
consumpƟon between 1985 and 2016. With coal‐ﬁred energy producing up to twice as much CO2 as 
other fossil fuels, reliance on coal as a primary energy source can be costly in terms of CO2 emissions. 
According to data from the European Union (EU), China’s CO2 emissions made up just under 30 
percent of the global total in 2017, making China’s emissions for the year greater than Africa, LaƟn 
America, and the European Union combined. For a country that produces over 3.53 billion tons of coal 
annually, slowing domesƟc producƟon would not only put 2.3 million coal miners out of work by 
2020, but also drasƟcally harm China’s stagnaƟng economy. In order to combat this, the PRC has 
adopted an unusual strategy: the exportaƟon of carbon emissions. 
Through the use of infrastructure investments, the PRC has been able to uƟlize its Belt and Road 
IniƟaƟve to invest in coal‐based energy producƟon throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and 
Africa. Between 2000 and 2017, the Chinese Development Bank and the Export‐Import Bank of China 
has ﬁnanced $52 billion worth of coal projects overseas, eﬀecƟvely backing over one‐quarter of all 
coal plants under development outside of China today according to data from Boston University's 
Global Development Policy Center. While foreign investments in renewable energies have certainly 
been on the rise for China, reaching $44 billion in 2017, they have yet to eclipse the PRC’s conƟnued 
investments in coal. 
OŌen, China’s investments in coal‐based infrastructure go against a country's naƟonal interest. The 
Lamu Coal Power StaƟon in Kenya, which was under construcƟon by Power China and funded through 
Chinese banks, highlights this trend. For a country that has no preexisƟng coal‐based infrastructure, 
the Lamu Power StaƟon was a costly enigma. Not only would the power staƟon increase Kenya’s 
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greenhouse gas emissions by an esƟmated 700%, the plant would also be reliant on imported coal, 
making the power staƟon far from viable. Today, construcƟon of the Lamu Coal Power StaƟon is 
stalled due to community and naƟonal intervenƟon; however, the same cannot be said for 
Pakistan, which opened its doors to its ﬁrst coal‐ﬁred power plant in 2019 due to similar 
investments from the PRC. 
In Vietnam, Chinese ﬁrms have already built 15 coal‐ﬁred power plants, according to a report by 
the InsƟtute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). Vietnam's decision to abandon its 
cleaner‐burning nuclear power program in favor of coal‐ﬁred power can be linked to increasing 
Chinese investments in coal‐based energy such as a recent investment in a 1.75 billion coal‐ﬁred 
power plant in Vinh Tan by China Southern Power Grid and China Power InternaƟonal 
Development Company. China’s involvement in Bangladesh has also reached new highs. As of May 
2019, Chinese investments accounted for an esƟmated 78 percent of the country’s predicted coal‐
ﬁred capacity in 2022. This amounts to 18.4 gigawaƩs of coal‐ﬁred energy producƟon according to 
new ﬁgures by Greenpeace. However, as Bangladesh reaches the onset of an energy glut, the 
future of these projects is sƟll uncertain.  
As found by the IEEFA report, the biggest lenders for these coal‐based projects are Chinese policy 
banks such as China Development Bank and China Export‐Import Bank, with some investment 
backing coming from smaller state‐owned commercial banks like the Bank of China. State‐owned 
corporaƟons such as the State Grid CorporaƟon of China and China Energy Engineering CorporaƟon 
are also key developers for out of state coal‐based energy investments. These companies oŌen act 
as engineering, procurement, and construcƟon (EPC) contractors who typically take over 
operaƟons once construcƟon is ﬁnished. AddiƟonally, these EPCs oŌen employ a majority of 
Chinese workers leading to low levels of local job creaƟon which can lead to conﬂicts, as seen in 
Indonesia in 2016. 
As China works to meet its Paris agreement goals, an excess of domesƟc coal‐based technology, 
infrastructure, and labor has started to accumulate within the PRC. If leŌ within China, these assets 
have the potenƟal to lead to massive opportunity costs, economic loss, and unemployment. This 
could further hurt the Chinese economy, which recently experienced its lowest economic growth 
rate in over 27 years. Through investment in oﬀshore coal‐based power, China is able to export a 
share of its coal‐based technology and labor that would otherwise go to waste. It is China’s 
conƟnued foreign investments in these emission producing industries that consƟtute China’s 
exported emissions. 
Carbon emissions from Southeast Asia sƟll remain small on a global scale, however, Southeast Asia 
is the fastest‐growing region for carbon emissions worldwide. According to a recent report by 
Tsinghua University, if Belt and Road IniƟaƟve countries conƟnue their current infrastructure 
investment paƩerns, they could account for 50 percent of global emissions by 2050. This makes 
reinvenƟng the way we assess a country’s climate goals crucial in the ﬁght to slow the eﬀects of 
climate change in Southeast Asia and the Paciﬁc Islands. As China races to reach its Paris 
Agreement goals, exported emissions need to be assessed and monitored as part of every country's 
climate impact. While China has made huge strides domesƟcally, they have put developing naƟons 
at risk by invesƟng in outdated and increasingly non‐viable coal‐based energy technologies. 
"Through investment in 
oﬀshore coal‐based 
power, China is able to 
export a share of its coal‐
based technology and 
labor that would 
otherwise go to waste.”  
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